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Fencing off ideas: enclosure & the 
disappearance of the public domain 
The law locks up the man or woman 
Who steals the goose from off the common 
But leaves the greater villain loose 
Who steals the common from off the goose. 
The law demands that we atone 
When we take things we do not own 
But leaves the lords and ladies fine 
Who take things that are yours and mine. 
The poor and wretched don't escape 
If they conspire the law to break; 
This must be so but they endure 
Those who conspire to make the law. 
The law locks up the man or woman 
Who steals the goose from off the common 
And geese will still a common lack 
Till they go and steal it back. 
JL his poem is one of the pithiest con 
demnations of the English enclosure 
movement, the process of fencing off 
common land and turning it into private 
property. (Although we refer to it as "f/ze 
enclosure movement," it was actually a 
series of enclosures that started in the 
fifteenth century and went on, with dif 
fering means, ends, and varieties of state 
involvement, until the nineteenth.) The 
poem manages in a few lines to criticize 
double standards, expose the artificial 
and controversial nature of property 
rights, and take a slap at the legitimacy 
of state power. And it does it all with 
humor, without jargon, and in rhyming 
couplets. 
Sir Thomas More went further, though 
he used sheep rather than geese to make 
his point. He argued that enclosure was 
not 
merely unjust in itself, but harmful 
in its consequences. It was a cause of eco 
nomic inequality, crime, and social dis 
location. 
Your 
sheep that were wont to be so meek 
and tame, and so small eaters, now, as I 
hear say, be become so great devourers 
and so wild, that they eat up, and swallow 
down the very men themselves. They con 
sume, destroy, and devour whole fields, 
houses, and cities. For look in what parts 
of the realm doth grow the finest and 
therefore dearest wool, there noblemen 
and gentlemen... leave no ground for 
tillage, they enclose all into pastures ; they 
throw down houses ; they pluck down 
towns, and leave nothing standing, but 
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only the church to be made a sheep-house. 
.. 
.Therefore that one covetous and insa 
tiable cormorant and very plague of his 
native country may compass about and 
enclose many thousand acres of ground 
together within one pale or hedge, the 
husbandmen be thrust out of their own. 
The enclosure movement continues to 
draw our attention. It offers irresistible 
ironies about the two-edged sword of 
"respect for property" and lessons about 
the role of the state in making controver 
sial, policy-laden decisions to define 
property rights in ways that subsequent 
ly come to seem both natural and neu 
tral. 
Following in the footsteps of Thomas 
More, critics have long argued that the 
enclosure movement imposed devastat 
ing costs on one segment of society. 
Some of these costs were brutally and 
relentlessly "material" 
- for example, the 
conversion of crofters and freeholders 
into peons, seasonal wage-laborers, or 
simply, as More argued in Utopia, beg 
gars and thieves. But other harms were 
harder to classify : the loss of a form of 
life, and the relentless power of market 
logic to migrate to new areas, disrupting 
traditional social relationships, views of 
the self, and even the relationship of 
human beings to the environment. 
A great many economic historians 
have begged to differ. As they see the 
matter, the critics of enclosure have fall 
en prey to the worst kind of sentimental 
ity, romanticizing a form of life that was 
neither comfortable nor noble, and cer 
tainly not very egalitarian. 
From an economist's point of view, the 
key fact about the enclosure movement 
is that it worked: this new property 
regime allowed an unparalleled expan 
sion of productive possibilities. By trans 
ferring inefficiently managed common 
land into the hands of a single owner, 
enclosure averted one aptly named 
"tragedy" of the commons: overuse. It 
also created incentives for large-scale 
investment, allowed control over 
exploitation, and in general ensured that 
the resource would be used efficiently. 
Unless the feudal lord knew that the 
fruits of his labor would be his alone, he 
would not have invested in drainage 
schemes, the purchase of sheep, or the 
rotation of crops in order to increase the 
yield of his acreage. 
Strong private-property rights helped 
to avoid the tragedies of both overuse 
and underinvestment. As a result of the 
enclosure movement, fewer Englishmen 
starved: more grain was grown, and 
more 
sheep were raised. If the price of 
this social gain was a greater concentra 
tion of economic power in fewer hands 
and despoliation of the environment, so 
be it. Those who weep about the terrible 
effects of private property should realize 
that it literally saved lives. Or so say the 
economic historians. 
JL his is a debate of more than antiquari 
an interest, for we are in the midst of a 
new kind of enclosure movement, this 
one aimed at exploiting a new and intan 
gible kind of commons 
- 
call it a "com 
mons of the mind."1 Once again, things 
that were formerly thought to be un 
commodifiable, essentially common, or 
outside the market altogether are being 
turned into private possessions under a 
new kind of property regime. But this 
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i The analogy to the enclosure movement has 
been too succulent to resist. To my knowledge, 
Ben Kaplan, Pamela Samuleson, Yochai 
Benkler, David Lange, Christopher May, and 
Keith Aoki have all employed the trope, as I 
have myself on previous occasions. For a partic 
ularly thoughtful and careful development of 
the parallelism see Hannibal Travis, "Pirates of 
the Information Infrastructure : Blackstonian 
Copyright and the First Amendment," Berkeley 
Tech. Law Journal 15 (2) (Spring 2000) : 777. 
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time the property in question is intangi 
ble, existing in databases, business 
methods, and gene sequences. 
Take the human genome as an exam 
ple. The opponents of "enclosure" have 
claimed that the genome "belongs to 
everyone," that it is literally "the com 
mon heritage of humankind." They say 
that the code of life ought not and per 
haps in some sense cannot be owned by 
an individual or a corporation. When 
patents have been granted for stem cells 
and gene sequences, critics have mused 
darkly about the way in which the state 
is simply handing over monopoly power 
to private parties, potentially thwarting 
future research and innovation. The new 
monopolists have names like Geron, 
Celera, and Human Genome Sciences, 
and their holdings are in the form of 
patent portfolios rather than oil wells or 
steel plants. 
Alongside these reports about the 
beneficiaries of the new property scheme 
run news stories about those who were 
not so fortunate, the commoners of the 
genetic enclosure. Law students across 
America now read Moore v. Regents, a 
California Supreme Court case deciding 
that poor Mr. Moore had no property 
right to a cell line derived from his 
spleen. In this case, the court decided 
that giving property rights to "sources" 
would make it more difficult for scien 
tists to share cell lines with fellow re 
searchers - reading the decision, one can 
almost picture the Styrofoam coolers 
criss-crossing the country by Federal 
Express in an orgy of altruistic flesh 
swapping. Yet this fear of the pernicious 
effects of property rights did not last for 
long. In another portion of the opinion 
the court speaks approvingly of the 
patent granted to the doctors whose 
inventive genius created a billion-dollar 
cell line from Mr. Moore's 
"naturally 
occurring raw material." Like the com 
moners, Mr. Moore finds that his natu 
ralistic and traditional property claims 
are portrayed as impediments to innova 
tion. Like the beneficiaries of enclosure, 
the doctors are granted a property right 
to encourage efficient development of a 
wasted resource. 
Of course, like the first enclosure 
movement, this new one has its defend 
ers. To the question "should there be 
patents over human genes?" the answer 
will be 
"private property saves lives." 
Only by extending the reach of property 
rights can the state guarantee the invest 
ment of time, ingenuity, and capital nec 
essary to produce new drugs and gene 
therapies. Private-property rights are a 
necessary incentive to research; econo 
mists need only worry about how to al 
locate these rights most efficiently. Or so 
say the advocates of private-property 
rights. 
The genome is not the only area to 
have been partially "enclosed" in the 
past decade. In recent years, intellectual 
property rights have been dramatically 
expanded in many different fields of 
human endeavor - from business 
method patents to the Digital Millenni 
um Copyright Act, from trademark 
antidilution rulings to the European 
Database Protection Directive. 
In 1918, the American jurist Louis 
Brandeis confidently claimed that 
" 
[t]he 
general rule of law is, that the noblest of 
human productions 
- 
knowledge, truths 
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas 
- 
become, after voluntary communication 
to others, free as the air to common 
use." At the time that Brandeis made 
that remark, intellectual property rights 
were the exception rather than the rule ; 
it was widely agreed that ideas and facts 
must always remain in the public do 
main. But that old consensus is now 
under attack. Long-standing limits on 
the reach of intellectual property 
- the 
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antierosion walls around the public 
domain - are being eaten away each year. 
The annual process of updating my 
syllabus for a basic intellectual property 
course provides a nice snapshot of what 
is going on. I can wax nostalgic looking 
back to a five-year-old text, with its con 
fident list of the subject matter that 
intellectual property rights couldnt 
cover, the privileges that circumscribed 
the rights that did exist, the length of 
time before a work fell into the public 
domain. In each case, the old limits have 
recently been changed or challenged. 
Patents are increasingly stretched out 
to cover "ideas" that twenty years ago all 
scholars would have agreed were un 
patentable: the so-called business meth 
od patents, which cover such "inven 
tions" as auctions or accounting meth 
ods, are an obvious example. Most trou 
bling of all are the attempts to introduce 
intellectual property rights over mere 
compilations of facts. If Anglo-American 
intellectual property law had an article 
of faith, it was that unoriginal compila 
tions of facts would remain in the public 
domain. This was "no mere accident of a 
statutory scheme," as the Supreme 
Court once put it: protecting the raw 
material of science and speech is as 
important to the next generation of 
innovation as the intellectual property 
rights themselves. The system would 
offer a limited monopoly for an inven 
tion or an original expression of ideas, 
but the monopoly was to be tightly con 
fined to the layer of invention or expres 
sion. The facts below, or the ideas above, 
would remain free for all to build upon. 
Even the stuff that could be protected by 
intellectual property 
- the drug or the 
poem, say 
- was 
supposed to pass into 
the public domain after a certain num 
ber of years. As Jefferson and Macaulay 
both observed, intellectual property 
rights were necessary evils. They should 
be strictly limited in both time and 
extent. 
Today, these traditional assumptions 
about intellectual property law are under 
attack. Some of the challenges are sub 
tle. In patent law, stretched interpreta 
tions of novelty and nonobviousness 
allow intellectual property rights to 
move closer and closer to the underlying 
datalayer; gene sequence patents come 
very close to being rights over a particu 
lar discovered arrangement of data 
- 
C's, 
G's, A's, and T's. Other challenges are 
overt; the European Database Directive 
does (and the various proposed database 
bills in the United States would) create 
proprietary rights over compilations of 
facts, often without even the carefully 
framed exceptions of the copyright 
scheme, such as the usefully protean cat 
egory of "fair use." 
The older strategy of intellectual prop 
erty law was a "braided" one : thread a 
thin layer of intellectual property rights 
around a commons of material from 
which future creators would draw. Even 
that thin layer of intellectual property 
rights was limited so as to allow access 
to the material when the private-proper 
ty owner might charge too much, or just 
refuse ; fair use allows for parody, com 
mentary, and criticism, and also for 
"decompilation" of computer programs 
so that Microsoft Word's competitors 
can 
reverse-engineer its features in order 
to make sure that their program can con 
vert Word files. (Those who prefer topo 
graphical metaphors might imagine a 
quilted pattern of public and private 
land, with legal rules specifying that cer 
tain areas - beaches, say 
- 
can never be 
privately owned, and accompanying 
rules giving public right of way through 
private land if there is a danger that 
access to the commons might otherwise 
be blocked.) 
From the inception of intellectual 
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property law in the eighteenth century 
until quite recently, protection of the 
public domain 
- the intangible com 
mons - was one fundamental goal of the 
law in most nations. In the new vision of 
intellectual property, however, property 
rights should be established everywhere ; 
more is better. Expanding patentable 
and copyrightable subject matter, 
lengthening the copyright term, giving 
legal protection to "digital barbed wire," 
even if it is used in part to prevent fair 
use : each of these can be understood as a 
vote of no confidence in the productive 
powers of the commons. We seem to be 
shifting from Brandeis's assumption 
that the "noblest of human productions 
are free as the air to common use" to the 
assumption that any human production 
left open to free use is inefficient, if not 
tragic. 
vJo far I have argued that there are pro 
found similarities between the first 
enclosure movement and our contempo 
rary expansion of intellectual property. 
Today, as in the fifteenth century, propo 
nents and opponents of enclosure are 
locked in battle, hurling at each other 
incommensurable claims about innova 
tion, efficiency, traditional values, the 
boundaries of the market, the saving of 
lives, the loss of familiar liberties. Once 
again, opposition to enclosure is por 
trayed as economically illiterate ; the 
beneficiaries of enclosure tell us that an 
expansion of property rights is needed in 
order to fuel progress. Indeed, the 
post-Cold War "Washington Consen 
sus" is invoked to claim that the lesson 
of history itself is that the only way one 
gets growth and efficiency is through 
markets ; property rights, surely, are the 
sine qua non of markets. 
But if there are similarities between 
the two enclosure movements, there are 
also crucial differences. The digitized 
and networked "commons of the mind," 
circa 2002, differs greatly from the 
grassy and isolated common plots of 
land that dotted England circa 1400.2 
Some of the key differences should lead 
us to question whether stronger intellec 
tual property rights are really either nec 
essary or desirable. 
For example, consider the well-known 
fact that a digital text, unlike a plot of 
land, can be used by countless people 
simultaneously without mutual interfer 
ence or destruction of the shared 
resource. Unlike an earthly commons, 
the commons of the mind is generally 
what economists call "nonrival." Many 
uses of land are mutually exclusive. If I 
am 
using the field for grazing, it may 
Fencing off 
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2 The differences are particularly strong in the 
arguments over "desert" 
- 
are these property 
rights deserved, or are they simply violations of 
the public trust, privatizations of the com 
mons ? For example, some would say that we 
never had the same traditional claims over the 
genetic commons that the victims of the first 
enclosure movement had over theirs ; this is 
more like 
newly discovered frontier land, or 
perhaps even privately drained marshland, than 
it is like well-known common land that all have 
traditionally used. In this case, the enclosers 
can claim (though their claims are disputed) 
that they discovered or perhaps simply made 
usable the territory they seek to own. The 
opponents of gene patenting, on the other 
hand, turn more frequently than the farmers of 
the eighteenth century to religious and ethical 
arguments about the sanctity of life and the 
incompatibility of property with living systems. 
These arguments, or the appeals to free speech 
that dominate debates over digital intellectual 
property, have no precise analogue in debates 
over hunting or pasturage, although, again, 
there are common themes. For example, we are 
already seeing nostalgic laments of the loss of 
the immemorial rights of Internet users. At the 
same time, the old language of property law is 
turned to this more evanescent subject matter ; 
a favorite article title is "The Ancient Doctrine 
of Trespass to Websites" (I. Trotter Hardy, 
"The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web 
Sites," Journal of Online Law [Oct. 1996] : art. 7). 
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interfere with your plans to use it for 
growing crops. By contrast, a gene 
sequence, an MP3 file, or an image may 
be used by multiple parties ; my use does 
not interfere with yours. To simplify a 
complicated analysis, this means that 
the depredations through overuse that 
affect fields and fisheries are generally 
not a problem with intellectual property. 
(The exceptions to this statement turn 
out to be fascinating; in the interest of 
brevity I will ignore them entirely.) 
Thus, one cause of tragedy on the 
earthly commons generally does not 
arise on the commons of the mind. 
Overuse is normally not a problem. But 
what about incentives to create the intel 
lectual resources in the first place ? 
Here intellectual property, especially 
in our digitized age, seems at first glance 
to pose a unique problem. It has long 
been relatively easy for pirates to pro 
duce unauthorized copies of poems, 
novels, treatises, and musical composi 
tions. In the language of the economists, 
it has long been difficult, and in some 
cases 
virtually impossible, to stop one 
unit of an intellectual good from satisfy 
ing an infinite number of users at zero 
marginal cost. A familiar conclusion 
seems irresistible : without an ability to 
protect their creations against theft, cre 
ators will be unable to earn an adequate 
living. There will be inadequate incen 
tives to create. Thus the law must step in 
and create a monopoly called an intellec 
tual property right. 
This is the standard argument in favor 
of intellectual property rights, but it has 
recently acquired a historical dimension, 
a teleology of expansion over time. After 
all, in our digitized age, it is easier than 
ever before for pirates to copy not just a 
book, but a film, a photograph, a record 
ed piece of music, a drug formula, a 
computer program 
- the list goes on. 
Surely the historical lowering of copying 
and transmission costs implies a corre 
sponding need to increase the strength of 
intellectual property rights. 
Imagine a line. At one end sits a monk, 
painstakingly transcribing Aristotle's 
Poetics. In the middle lies the Gutenberg 
printing press. Three-quarters of the 
way along the line is a photocopying 
machine. At the end lies the Internet. At 
each stage, copying costs are lowered: 
Aristotle's text becomes ever more freely 
and widely accessible; indeed, the com 
plete text is currently available in both 
Greek and English to anyone with access 
to the Internet (at <www.perseus.tufts. 
edu>). 
Among some analysts, the assumption 
seems to be that the strength of intellec 
tual property rights must correspond 
inversely to the cost of copying. The 
argument goes something like this : To 
deal with the monk-copyist, we need no 
intellectual property right; physical con 
trol of the manuscript is enough. To deal 
with the Gutenberg press, we need the 
Statute of Anne. But to deal with the 
Internet, we need the Digital Millen 
nium Copyright Act, the No Electronic 
Theft Act, the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act, and perhaps even 
the Collections of Information Anti 
Piracy Act. Why? As copying costs 
approach zero, intellectual property 
rights must approach perfect control. 
And if a greater proportion of product 
value and GNP is now in the form of 
information, then obviously we have an 
independent reason to need strength 
ened protection. A five-dollar padlock 
would do for a garden shed, but not for a 
vault. 
Like any attractive but misleading 
argument, this one has some truth. The 
Internet does lower the cost of copying 
and facilitates illicit copying. The same 
technology also lowers the costs of pro 
duction, distribution, and advertising 
- 
l8 D dalus Spring 2002 
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and dramatically increases the size of 
the potential market. 
Is the "net" result, then, a loss to 
rights-holders such that we need to in 
crease protection in order to maintain a 
constant level of incentives ? The answer 
is not self-evident. 
A large, leaky market may actually 
produce more revenue than a small, 
tightly controlled market. What's more, 
the same technologies that allow for 
cheap copying also allow for swift and 
encyclopedic search engines 
- the best 
detection device for illicit copying ever 
invented. It would be impossible to say, 
on the basis of the evidence we have, 
that owners of protected content are 
better or worse off as a result of the 
Internet. 
My intuition 
- as well as our historical 
experience with prior "dangerous" tech 
nologies such as the VCR 
- 
points 
strongly to the possibility that copyright 
holders are better off. In any case, there 
simply isn't enough evidence, either to 
support my intuition or to support the 
conclusion that as copy costs decline 
intellectual property rights must be 
strengthened. Furthermore, given the 
known static and dynamic costs of 
monopolies, and the constitutional 
injunction to encourage the progress of 
science and useful arts, the burden 
should be on those requesting expanded 
intellectual property rights to prove 
their value. 
Another argument commonly offered 
in defense of granting new intellectual 
property rights stresses the increasing 
importance of products that use, 
embody, or process information in 
today's global economy. Perhaps the 
commons of the mind requires enclo 
sure because it is now such a vital sector 
of economic activity. The importance of 
agriculture to the economy was certainly 
one of the arguments for the first enclo 
sure movement. (Lovers of Patrick 
O'Brian's novels may remember Mat 
urin's stolid silence in the face of an 
admiral's increasingly vehement insis 
tence that enclosure was essential to 
produce the corn necessary to fight the 
Napoleonic war.) 
Here we come to another big differ 
ence between the commons of the mind 
and the earthly commons. As has fre 
quently been pointed out (by Jessica 
Litman, Pamela Samuelson, and Richard 
A. Posner, among others), information 
products are frequently made out of 
fragments of other information prod 
ucts ; one person's information output is 
someone else's information input. These 
inputs may be snippets of code, discov 
eries, prior research, images, genres of 
work, cultural references, databases of 
single nucleotide polymorphisms 
- 
all 
can function as raw material for future 
innovation. And every potential increase 
of protection over such products also 
raises the costs of, or reduces access to, 
the raw material to create new products. 
The right balance is difficult to strike. 
One Nobel Prize-winning economist has 
claimed that it is actually impossible to 
produce an "informationally efficient" 
market.3 Whether or not it is impossible 
in theory, it is surely a difficult problem 
in practice. In other words, even if en 
closure of the arable commons always 
produced gains (itself a subject of 
debate), enclosure of the information 
commons 
clearly has some potential to 
harm intellectual innovation. More 
property rights, even though they sup 
posedly offer greater incentives, do not 
necessarily ensure greater intellectual 
Fencing off 
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3 Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
"On the Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets," American Economic Review 70 
(1980) 1393. 
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productivity. Sometimes just the oppo 
site may be true.4 
IVJLy arguments so far have taken as a 
given the various problems to which 
modern intellectual property laws have 
been a response. I have discussed the 
extent to which the logic of enclosure 
works for the commons of the mind as 
well as it did for the arable commons, 
taking into account the effects of an in 
formation society and a global Internet. 
Remember that when I speak of enclo 
sure, I am talking about increases in the 
level of rights : protecting new subject 
matter for longer periods of time, crimi 
nalizing certain technologies, making it 
illegal to cut through digital fences even 
if they have the effect of foreclosing pre 
viously lawful uses, and so on. 
What I have not yet done is ask 
whether the brute fact of the Internet 
actually unsettles old assumptions and 
forces us to reconsider the need for in 
centives - at least in certain areas. But 
this is a question that cannot be evaded. 
For anyone interested in the way that 
computer networks may embody a new 
mode of collaborative production, an 
exemplary case to study is the open 
source software movement.5 This soft 
ware is released under a series of licens 
es, the most important being the Gen 
eral Public License, or GPL. The GPL 
specifies that anyone may copy the soft 
ware, provided the license remains 
attached and the "source code" for the 
software always remains available.6 
Users may add to or modify the code, 
may build on it and incorporate it into 
their own work, but if they do so then 
the new program created is also covered 
by the GPL. Some people refer to this as 
the "viral" nature of the license; others 
find the term offensive. The point, how 
ever, is that the open quality of the cre 
ative enterprise spreads ; it is not simply 
a donation of a program or a work to the 
public domain, but a continual accretion 
in which all gain the benefits of the pro 
gram on pain of agreeing to give their 
own additions and innovations back to 
the communal project. 
The open-source software movement 
has produced software that either rivals 
or exceeds the productive capacities of 
conventional proprietary software. Its 
adoption on the enterprise level is 
impressive, as are the various technical 
encomia to its strengths. 
But the most remarkable aspect of the 
open-source software movement is 
harder to see. It functions as a new kind 
of social system : many of those who 
contribute to the movement by writing a 
part of the software do so as volunteers, 
20 D dalus Spring 2002 
4 For a more technical account, see James 
Boyle, "Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic 
Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital 
Intellectual Property," Vanderbilt Law Review 536 
(2000): 2007, <http ://www.vanderbilt. 
edu/Law/lawreview/vol536/boyle .pdf >. 
5 Glyn Moody, The Rebel Code : The Inside Story 
of Linux and the Open Source Revolution 
(Cambridge, Mass. : Perseus Pub., 2001) ; Peter 
Wayner, Free for All : How Linux and the Free 
Software Movement Undercut the High-tech Titans 
(New York: HarperBusiness, 2000). See also 
Eben Moglen, "Anarchism Triumphant : Free 
Software and the Death of Copyright," in the 
online journal First Monday (1999), <http :// 
emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/ 
anarchism.html>. 
6 Proprietary, or "binary only," software is 
generally released only once the source code 
has been compiled into machine-readable 
object code format, a form that is impenetrable 
to the user. Even if you were a master program 
mer, and if the provisions of the Copyright Act, 
the appropriate licenses, and the DMCA did 
not forbid you from doing so, you would be 
unable to modify commercial proprietary soft 
ware so as to customize it for your needs, 
remove a bug, or add a feature. Open-source 
programmers say disdainfully that it is like buy 
ing a car with "the hood welded shut." 
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without direct remuneration. Here, it 
seems, we have a classic public good 
- 
code that can be copied freely, and sold 
or redistributed without paying the cre 
ator or creators. 
Skeptics, of course, wonder if this 
mode of production can be sustained. 
There seem to be inadequate incentives 
to ensure continued productivity and 
innovation. Epur si muove, as Galileo is 
reputed to have said in the face of Car 
dinal Bellarmine's certainties - "And yet 
it moves." 
Still, there is no consensus about why 
the system works. Perhaps the open 
source software movement is actually a 
contemporary form of potlatch, in 
which one gains prestige by the extrava 
gance of the resources one "wastes." 
Perhaps it is simply a smart way for a 
young programmer to build a resume 
that will eventually pay off in a conven 
tional job. Or perhaps the movement is 
driven by what Karl Marx considered an 
innate aspect of our "species-being" : 
namely, the urge to create, which drives 
human beings to labor out of love rather 
than material need. 
Like Yochai Benkler and Eben Mog 
len, I believe that such speculation is 
interesting but irrelevant.7 My own 
explanation for why the system works is 
this: 
Assume a random distribution of 
incentive structures in different people, 
a global network. Assume also that the 
costs of transmission, information shar 
ing, and copying approach zero. Assume 
finally a modular creation process. With 
these assumptions, it just doesn't matter 
why unpaid code writers do what they 
do ; what matters is that a certain num 
ber of people will do what the unpaid 
code writers do. One may do it for love 
of the species, another in the hope of a 
better job, a third for the joy of solving 
puzzles, and so on. Each person also has 
his or her own "reserve price," the point 
at which he or she says "now I will turn 
off Survivor and go and create some 
thing." But on a global network, there 
are a lot of people, and with numbers 
that big, and information-overhead that 
small, even relatively hard projects will 
attract a sufficient number of motivated 
and skilled people to sustain the creative 
process. For the whole structure to work 
without large-scale centralized coordi 
nation, the creation process has to be 
modular, with "units" of different size 
and complexity, each requiring slightly 
different expertise, all of which can be 
added together to make a grand whole. I 
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7 See Yochai Benkler, "Coase's Penguin, or, 
Linux and the Nature of the Firm," October 
2001, unpublished draft, <http ://www. 
law. duke. edu/pd/papers/Coase% 27S_Penguin. 
pdfx For a seminal statement relying on the 
innate human love of creativity as the motiva 
tion, see Moglen, "Anarchism Triumphant." 
"[Incentives" is merely a metaphor, and as a 
metaphor to describe human creative activity 
it's pretty crummy. I have said this before, but 
the better metaphor arose on the day Michael 
Faraday first noticed what happened when he 
wrapped a coil of wire around a magnet and 
spun the magnet. Current flows in such a wire, 
but we don't ask what the incentive is for the 
electrons to leave home. We say that the cur 
rent results from an emergent property of the 
system, which we call induction. The question 
we ask is 'what's the resistance of the wire?' 
So Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to 
Faraday's Law says that if you wrap the 
Internet around every person on the planet 
and spin the planet, software flows in the net 
work. It's an emergent property of connected 
human minds that they create things for one 
another's pleasure and to conquer their 
uneasy sense of being too alone. The only 
question to ask is, what's the resistance of the 
network? Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to 
Ohm's Law states that the resistance of the 
network is directly proportional to the field 
strength of the 'intellectual property' system. 
So the 
right answer to the econodwarf is, 
resist the resistance." 
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can work on the sendmail program, you 
on the search algorithms. More likely, 
lots of people try to solve the sendmail 
and search algorithm problems, and 
their products are judged by the commu 
nity and the best ones adopted. Under 
these conditions - an ad hoc mode of 
production that curiously combines 
anarchism and entrepreneurialism, 
Kropotkin and Adam Smith 
- we will get 
innovation and productivity, without 
having to rely on the proprietary model. 
What's more (and this is a truly fasci 
nating twist), when the production pro 
cess does need more centralized coordi 
nation, some governance that guides 
how the modular bits are most produc 
tively associated, it is at least theoretical 
ly possible that we can come up with the 
control system in exactly the same way ; 
distributed production is potentially 
recursive. Governance processes, too, 
can be assembled through distributed 
methods on a global network, by people 
with widely varying motivations, skills, 
and reserve prices. 
Again, skeptics will have their doubts. 
One organization theorist I know dis 
misses the possibility of anarchic coordi 
nation as 
"governance by food fight." 
Anyone who has ever been on an organi 
zational listserv, or been part of a global 
production process run by people who 
are long on brains and short on social 
skills, knows how accurate that descrip 
tion is. Epur si muove. 
But, in the language of computer pro 
grammers, does the open-source soft 
ware movement "scale" ? Can we gener 
alize anything from this limited exam 
ple ? How many types of production, 
innovation, and research fit into the 
model I have just described? After all, 
for lots of types of innovation and inven 
tion one needs hardware, capital invest 
ment, large-scale real-world data collec 
tion, stuff 
- in all its facticity and infinite 
recalcitrance. Maybe the open-source 
model has solved the individual incen 
tives problem, but that's not the only 
problem. And how many types of inno 
vation or cultural production are as 
modular as software? 
My own guess is that this method of 
production is far more common than we 
realize. "Even before the Internet," as 
some of my students have taken to say 
ing portentously, science, law, education, 
and musical genres all developed in ways 
that are markedly similar to the model I 
have described. "The marketplace of 
ideas," the continuous roiling develop 
ment in thought and norm that our 
political culture spawns, is itself an idea 
that owes much more to the distributed, 
nonproprietary model than it does to the 
special case of commodified innovation 
that we regulate through intellectual 
property law. It's not that copyright and 
patent haven't helped power the rise of 
modern civilization ; it's just that it 
would be wrong to see them as the only 
engine of innovation. Indeed, the mot 
toes of free software development have 
their counterparts in the theory of 
democracy and the open society. The 
open-source movement describes its 
advantage over closed and secretive sys 
tems concisely: "given enough eyeballs, 
all bugs are shallow." Karl Popper would 
have cheered. 
Furthermore, I suspect that the in 
creasing migration of the sciences to 
ward data-rich, processing-rich models 
will make it likely that a greater amount 
of innovation and discovery could fol 
low the distributed, nonproprietary 
model of intellectual production. Bio 
informatics and computational biology, 
the open-source genomics project at 
www.ensembl.org, the possibility of dis 
tributed data scrutiny by lay volunteers 
that NASA used on the Mars landing 
data - all of these offer intriguing 
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glances of a possible future. And finally, 
of course, the Internet is one big experi 
ment in distributed cultural production. 
My own utopia would include modes 
of nonproprietary intellectual produc 
tion flourishing alongside a scaled-down 
but still powerful intellectual property 
regime. Of course, my utopia hinges on 
a hunch about the future. Still, there is 
some possibility (I might say hope) that 
we could have a world in which much 
more intellectual production is free 
- 
"free" meaning that it is not subject to 
centralized control, and "free" meaning 
that its products are available without 
payment. Insofar as this is at least a possi 
ble future, then surely we should think 
twice before foreclosing it. 
Yet foreclosing this possibility is pre 
cisely what lawmakers and government 
regulators in America are now doing. 
The point about the dramatic recent 
expansion of intellectual property 
rights 
- in database protection bills and 
directives that extend intellectual prop 
erty rights to the layer of facts, in the 
efflorescence of software patents, in the 
validation of shrink-wrap licenses that 
bind third parties, in the Digital Millen 
nium Copyright Act's anticircumven 
tion provisions 
- is not merely that they 
hamper the nonproprietary mode of 
intellectual production unfairly and 
without justification. The point is rather 
that they run the risk of ruling it out 
altogether.8 
V Ve have come full circle. As I have 
shown, we are in many ways in the 
midst of a second enclosure movement. 
The opponents and proponents of 
enclosure are currently locked in battle, 
each appealing to conflicting and some 
times incommensurable claims about 
efficiency, innovation, justice, and the 
limits of the market. 
But should there be a second enclosure 
movement? Do we know that property 
rights in this sphere will yield the same 
surge of productive energy that they did 
when applied to arable land? 
I think the answer is a resounding No. 
We are rushing to fence in ever-larger 
stretches of the commons of the mind 
without convincing economic evidence 
that enclosure will help either produc 
tivity or innovation 
- 
and with very 
good reason to believe it may actually 
hurt them.9 
As I have argued elsewhere, this 
process should bother people across the 
ideological spectrum, from civil libertar 
ians to free marketeers. Researchers and 
scientists should be particularly worried 
by what is happening. Up to now, the 
American system of science, for all its 
flaws, has worked astoundingly well; 
changing some of its fundamental prem 
ises, such as by moving property rights 
into the data layer, is not something to 
be done lightly. 
The dangers are particularly acute at 
the moment for three reasons. First, 
under the conditions that currently 
obtain in our digitized commons of the 
mind, the creation of new intellectual 
property rights tends, in a vicious circle, 
to create still further demands for new 
intellectual property rights. The argu 
ment is a little too complicated to lay out 
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8 This point has been ably made by, inter alia, 
Pamela Samuelson, Jessica Litman, Jerry 
Reichman, Larry Lessig, and Yochai Benkler. 
Each has a slightly different focus and emphasis 
on the problem, but each has pointed out the 
impediments now being erected to distrib 
uted, nonproprietary solutions. See also Boyle, 
"Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?" 
9 Some of the legislation involved is also con 
stitutionally dubious, under the First Amend 
ment and Art i sec. 8 cl. 8 of the Constitution, 
but that is a point for another paper. 
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here.10 But in essence the position is 
this : once a new intellectual property 
right has been created over some infor 
mational good, the only way to ensure 
efficient allocation of that good is to give 
the rights holder the ability to charge 
every user the exact maximum each con 
sumer is willing to pay, so that the mar 
ket can be perfectly segregated by price. 
In order to protect their ability to set 
prices for digital intellectual property 
goods, whose marginal cost to produce 
and distribute in fact approaches zero, 
the rights holders will inevitably argue 
that they need even more changes of the 
rules in their favor: relaxed privacy stan 
dards, so they can know more about 
consumers' price points; enforceable 
shrink-wrap or click-wrap contracts, so 
that consumers can be held to the term 
of a particular license, no matter how 
restrictive ; and changes in antitrust 
rules, to allow for a variety of practices 
that are currently illegal, such as resale 
price maintenance and various forms of 
"tying." Rights holders will also claim 
that they need technical changes with 
legal backing: for example, the creation 
of personalized digital objects surround 
ed by state-sanctioned digital fences, 
objects that are tied to particular users 
and particular computers, so that read 
ing my e-book on your machine is either 
technically impossible, a crime, or a 
tort - or possibly all three. My conclu 
sion : extending ever-stronger intellectu 
al property rights is a very slippery slope. 
Second, the broader the scope of intel 
lectual property rights, the more the 
characteristics of the Internet that have 
made it so attractive to civil libertari 
ans - its distributed, anonymous charac 
ter, its resistance to control or filtering 
by public or private entities, its global 
nature - start to seem like vices rather 
than virtues. The process of trying to 
make the Net safe for price discrimina 
tion has already begun. Yet as Lawrence 
Lessig has argued, this is a fundamental 
political choice that ought to be made 
deliberately and publicly, not as a side 
effect of an economically dubious digital 
enclosure movement. Because of some 
threats, such as terrorism, we might 
choose to live in a pervasively monitored 
electronic environment in which identi 
ty and geography, and thus regulability, 
have been reintroduced. (In my own 
view, the price is not worth paying.) But 
to do so on the basis of some bad micro 
economic arguments about the needs of 
the entertainment industry and in the 
absence of good empirical evidence, and 
to foreclose some of the most interesting 
new productive possibilities in the 
process 
- 
well, that would be really sad. 
Third, the arguments in favor of the 
new enclosure movement depend heavi 
ly on the intellectually complacent, ana 
lytically unsound assumptions of "neo 
liberal orthodoxy," the "Washington 
consensus." Convinced that property is 
good, and that creating more property 
rights is better, neoliberals are primed to 
hand out patents on gene sequences and 
stem cell lines and copyrights on compi 
lations of facts. It would be ironic, to say 
the least, to let such neoliberal convic 
tions determine the fate of the informa 
tion commons, the one area where the 
pros and cons of a property regime need 
to be most delicately balanced, and also 
an area where the possible consequences 
for the public good ought to be vigorous 
ly and openly debated. 
What is to be done, then ? I cannot lay 
out a full answer here, but I would sug 
gest two broad strategies. First, we ought 
to insist on considerably better empiri 
cal and economic evidence before sign 
ing on to the proposals of the second 
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enclosure movement. There are a few 
serious comparative and historical stud 
ies of the economics of innovation, but 
we need a lot more. Indeed, there should 
be an annual audit of our intellectual 
property system, perhaps by the General 
Accounting Office. What are the costs 
- 
static and dynamic 
- 
and the benefits of 
our current intellectual property re 
gime? After all, this is one of the largest 
industry subsidies given by government 
(through its granting of patents and 
copyrights); it deserves the same search 
ing scrutiny that we apply to the recipi 
ents of other state subsidies. I am a firm 
believer in intellectual property rights ; 
properly balanced and judiciously 
applied, such rights promise us a won 
derfully decentralized system for the 
promotion of innovation. But this is a 
rational belief in particular rules based 
on 
empirical evidence, not an unques 
tioning faith that any increase in intel 
lectual property rights is automatically 
good. 
Second, we need to make clear the 
current dangers to the public domain, in 
the same way that environmental 
activists in the 1950s and 1960s made 
visible not only particular environmen 
tal threats but the very existence of "the 
environment" itself. The environmental 
movement gained much of its political 
power by pointing out that there were 
structural reasons why lawmakers were 
likely to make bad environmental deci 
sions : a legal system based on a particu 
lar notion of what 
"private property" 
entailed, and a technological tendency 
to treat the world as a simple, linear set 
of causes and effects, ignoring the com 
plex interrelationship among natural 
systems. In both of these conceptual sys 
tems, the environment actually disap 
peared; there was no place for it in the 
analysis. Small surprise, then, that law 
makers were not able to protect it prop 
erly. 
We should press a similar argu 
ment - as I have done here - in the case 
of the public domain.11 We should 
exploit the power of a concept like the 
public domain both to clarify and to 
reshape perceptions of self-interest. The 
idea that there is a public domain 
- a 
"commons of the mind" - can help a 
coalition to be built around a reframed 
conception of common interest. In the 
narrowest sense, that common interest 
might be the realization, spurred by 
greater attention to intellectual interre 
lationships, that the freest possible cir 
culation of ideas and facts is important 
to anyone whose well-being significant 
ly depends on intellectual innovation 
and productivity 
- that is to say, every 
citizen of the world. 
The poem with which I began this 
essay contained some advice : And geese 
will still a common lack/Till they go and 
steal it back. 
I can't match the terseness or the 
rhyme. But if we blithely assume that 
the second enclosure movement will 
have the same benign effects as the first, 
we may look like very silly geese indeed. 
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il An expanded version of this argument can 
be found in "A Politics of Intellectual Property : 
Environmentalist! for the Net," Duke Law 
Journal 47 (1) (1997): 87, <http://www. 
law. duke. edu/boylesite/intprop. htm >. 
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